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Introduction 
 
After the recent round of State Budgets The Australian newspaper 
editorialised that if Labor state treasurers were any guide, “we are all fiscal 
conservatives now”1   The comment particularly referred to South Australian 
Treasurer Kevin Foley’s self imposed “mission” of restoring the State’s triple-
A credit rating.  After his 2003 budget Foley had suggested that a triple A 
rating from international credit rating agencies “should be the goal of every 
treasurer”.2.  His enthusiasm and commitment to regaining the top rating was 
undiminished in 2004 leading to the media’s description of a “grand 
obsession” in pursuit of a “fiscal holy grail”.3   Foley is not alone in this view, 
and his conviction that obtaining the highest possible rating is a mark of 
successful government is also shared by his colleagues in each of the other 
States.  The Premier of NSW, for example, listed the maintenance of his states 
triple A rating as a major achievement in his election day message to the 
voters at the NSW poll last year.4 
 
The States began to engage with international credit rating agencies and start 
the process of “getting rated” in the 1980’s as they sought to enter 
international financial markets.  It was apparent at that time that the external 
scrutiny inherent in the rating process had political implications, particularly 
in the way governments were able to represent their financial policies to the 
Parliament and to the electorate.  However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is 
clear there were deeper and more far reaching changes occurring and that as 
part of the price for entering financial markets state governments were being 
required to accept the disciplines, principles, and ideology of the market.   
 
It is easier now to recognise the shape and extent of the changes that have 
occurred as politicians and administrators combined to transform the public 
sector as part of a drive to make the Australian economy more internationally 
competitive.5  The practical consequences have ranged from the growth of 
“managerialism”, with its emphasis on contractual arrangements and private 
sector styles of management, to the development of National Competition 
Policy, with its encouragement of outsourcing and privatisation, from the 
                                                 
1 "Responsible, but Unadventurous," The Australian, 28 May 2004. 
2 AAP, "AAA Credit Rating an Achievable Goal: Foley," AAP General News (Australia), 29 May 2003. 
3 Michael McGuire, "Treasurer Closer to His Fiscal Holy Grail," The Australian, 28 May 2004. 
4 Bob Carr, "Committed to Renewal - NSW Election 2003," Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 22 March 2003.   
5 Herman Schwartz, "Small States in Big Trouble: State Reorganisation in Australia, Denmark, New 
Zealand, and Sweden in the 1980s," World Politics 46, no. July (1994).  p.531.  Schwartz outlines the 
argument that the state, particularly the welfare state, was the largest single part of the non-tradable 
sector, rising costs within which decreased the competitiveness of tradable firms.  See also John 
Wiseman, Global Nation? Australia and the Politics of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). who suggests that during the Hawke governments of the 1980s, “Competitiveness was to 
become both the diagnosis and the cure for all kinds of economic and social ills, with the choice of 
remedies underpinned by increasingly dominant ‘economic rationalist’, neo-liberal economic policies”  
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greater centralising of control over spending, to the embrace of accrual 
accounting.  In a wide range of areas traditionally seen as the sole province of 
the public sector, (for example, health and education, including the 
universities) increasingly the strategy has been to commodify the service so 
that it is possible to distribute or allocate it through the market process.  
 
The focus of this paper is the part played by credit rating agencies in creating 
the circumstances that have led to these policies being adopted.  This does not 
presume a direct causal link.  But rather, in a economy being transformed by 
globalisation, the role of credit rating agencies in the critical task of funding 
the public sector put them in a position in which they have become, the 
standard bearers for the market and the philosophy which underpins it across 
the whole range of public sector activity. 
 
The paper argues that the international credit rating agencies have had, and 
continue to have, a major role in shaping the public policy of state 
governments, and the management of their public sector, through the central 
part they play in the process by which those governments’ raise funds.  In 
effect they have become both part of the broader regulatory structure of 
public administration and the means by which the requirements of global 
financial markets are transmitted to the public sector.  They are an unseen but 
ever present “participant” in the business of making policy.6 
 
Deregulation in both domestic and international financial markets during the 
1980s created attractive opportunities for the States to raise funds.  However, 
they were also pushed towards the markets by the Commonwealth 
Government as part of an overt strategy to restrain State borrowings.  The 
Commonwealth’s Budget Papers record that changes to Loan Council 
borrowing arrangements throughout that period were designed to “facilitate 
financial market scrutiny of public sector finances via better reporting and so 
make jurisdictions more accountable to the markets”.7   These new financial 
arrangements have been described more colourfully as having “exposed the 
States’ soft underbellies to the sharp teeth of the CRAs, who immediately 
began to rate and re-rate the States with some enthusiasm.”8    
 
                                                 
6 H. K. Colebatch, Policy, 2nd ed. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002).se the discussion pp 23 –
30.  In the terms Colebatch uses, rating agencies have both ‘authority’ and ‘expertise’ as the basis for 
‘participation’. 
7 "Budget Paper No4: Commonwealth Financial Relations with Other Levels of Government 1993-1994  
Pp90 of 1993," (Canberra: AGPS, 1993).P. 67.  See also K. T Davis, "Public Sector Securities Market," in 
The Australian Financial System: Evolution Policy and Practice, ed. M K Lewis, and R H Wallace 
(Melbourne: Longman, 1997). p.436 
8 David Hayward, and Mike Salvaris, "Rating the States: Credit Rating Agencies and the Australian 
State Governments," Journal of Australian Political Economy 34 (1994). p.20 
Geoff Anderson: Standard Bearers for the Markets 
 Page 5
Today it would appear that the rating agencies have moved from being an 
instrument of, or means to entry into financial markets, to a significant arbiter 
of what comprises good government. 
 
This paper will look at how the rating agencies came to occupy this role.  I 
will argue that the changes that gave rise to the increased importance of credit 
rating agencies are better understood when seen the context of economic 
globalisation generally, and globalisation of financial markets in particular.  In 
Australia the response to globalisation drove the process of financial 
deregulation, which began in the mid 1970s and rapidly gathered velocity 
during the first Hawke Government, particularly following the floating of the 
Australian dollar.  
 
These changes will be discussed within the context of what has been 
described as a system of  “new global finance”9 that developed as a result of 
globalisation, and the public role that credit rating agencies play within that 
system.  In particular, the way in which they act as private makers of public 
policy, a role in which they “help to privatize policy making, narrowing the 
sphere of government intervention”10  
The paper concludes that this new environment has significant implications 
for the development of public policy and the management task within the 
public sector.  It also gives rise to a further set of issues surrounding the 
relationship between governments and the rating agencies.  In particular, how 
the threat of a downgrade or promise of an upgrade has been used by 
governments as part of their political communication strategy both externally 
to the electorate and internally to the public sector. .  And what  of the 
agencies themselves, how valid is their approach and methodology? 11 
 
While the focus of this paper is the rating process and the development of 
financial policy in the 1980s and 1990s as it affected Australian state 
governments, my view is that these issues are not limited to Australia.  Indeed 
events in our region suggest that many states are facing internal change to 
                                                 
9 Timothy J Sinclair, "The Infrastructure of Global Governance: Quasi-Regulatory Mechanisms and the 
New Global Finance," Global Governance 7 (2001), Timothy J Sinclair, "Private Makers of Public Policy: 
Bond Rating Agencies and the New Global Finance," in Common Goods. Reinventing European and 
International Governance, ed. Adrienne Heritier (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), Timothy J. 
Sinclair, "Passing Judgement: Credit Rating Processes as Regulatory Mechanisms of Governance in the 
Emerging World Order," Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 Spring (1994), Timothy J. 
Sinclair, "Reinventing Authority: Embedded Knowledge Networks and the New Global Finance," 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 18 (2000). 
10 Sinclair, "The Infrastructure of Global Governance." P441 
11 The use of comments by rating agencies to pursue a particular political agenda is discussed in 
Hayward, "Rating the States.", which also raises some questions concerning the agencies methodology.  
Andrew Fight, The Ratings Game (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2001). has a more extended, and 
damming critique of the way the agencies operate.  The role of ratings in shaping the “image” of a 
government is discussed in Michael Kunczik, "News Media, Images of Nations and the Flow of 
International Capital with Special Reference to the Role of Rating Agencies," The Journal of International 
Communication 8, no. 1 (2002). 
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systems of government and administration as they engage with the global 
economy.   
 
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF FINANCE 
 
It is not difficult to find the term ‘globalisation’ being used by politicians to 
explain a change that has occurred, or justify an action that needs to be taken.  
But there is less understanding of how “globalisation” impacts on politics in a 
practical sense, or the means by which its affects the way the public sector is 
structured and managed.  12 
 
This lack of precision stems largely from the vagueness surrounding the term 
itself. Globalisation has been variously described as being at risk of becoming 
"the cliché of our times: the big idea which encompasses everything from 
global financial markets to the Internet"13,  and as replacing the cold war as the 
most overused and under-specified explanation for a variety of international 
events. It has been used to describe an historical epoch, an economic 
phenomenon, the triumph of American values and a sociological and 
technological revolution. 14   
 
Within the literature of politics and political economy the concept occupies 
"contested territory".15 That contest has given rise to continuing skirmishes 
ranging from how best to characterise the concept itself, whether in fact it 
does represent a new set of circumstances significantly different from past 
experience, the extent and nature of its impact on existing systems of 
government and democratic processes within nation states.  Following on 
from that, can globalisation permanently reshape and restrict the political 
process, or can politics can reassert itself and in turn “tame” globalisation. 
 
The nature of the debate, and the vagueness of definition of the term itself, 
has given rise to a focus on typologies, taxonomies and categorisations.  
David Held and his colleagues distinguish between the hypoglobalisers, the 
sceptics, and the transformationalists16.  Anthony Giddens more simply identifies 
                                                 
12 An exception as regards the political environment at the national level is Tom Conley, "The Domestic 
Politics of Globalisation," Australian Journal of Political Science 36, no. 2 (2001). pp223-246 
13 David and Anthony McGrew Held, David Goldblatt, and Jonathon Perraton, Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).p.1 
14 Richard Higgott, and Simon Reich, "Globalisation and Sites of Conflict: Towards Definition and 
Taxonomy," (University of Warwick Coventry: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalism, 
1998). P.2 
15 Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy (London: SAGE Publications, 1998). P.79,  
also Mark Beeson, "Globalisation and International Trade: International Economic Policies and the 
'National Interest'," in The Politics of Australian Society: Political Issues for the New Century, ed. Paul 
Boreham, Geoffrey Stokes and Richard Hall (Longman, 2000). P, 214  Dicken and Beeson come from 
different sides of the contest. 
16 Held, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture.p.3 
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sceptics and radicals, 17while John Wiseman attempts to capture some of the 
ideology and fervour of the political debate by suggesting a differentiation 
between fanatical supporters, progressive competitors, conservative sceptics, and 
socialist challengers.  18 
 
While typologies are sometimes useful as a means of establishing a conceptual 
picture of an overall debate, as with all broad categorisations nuance is often 
lost in the interest of neatness.  Similarly, unhelpful is the contradictory 
extremes around which the arguments are often arranged with unambiguous 
declarations of a soon to be borderless world at one end of the spectrum, 
opposed by claims that little change has in fact occurred beyond a degree of 
increased internationalization which merely mirrors what has gone before.19 
 
However, regardless of whatever concept or theory particular commentators 
adopt, the rapid growth of financial markets is usually of central importance.20  
Susan Strange brought focus to the debate on the creation of credit within the 
financial system with her description of the western financial system as “ 
rapidly coming to resemble nothing as much as a vast casino” in which all of 
us are involuntary engaged in the days play.21 Analysing the uncertainty 
evident in the international financial system in the 1980s she identified three 
key sets of prices, the price of currencies, (exchange rates) the price of credit, 
(interest rates) and the price of oil.  Each was inherently unstable and in turn 
fed uncertainty and volatility in the others.  The common factor linking them 
was the international financial system, “the rootstock from whose disorders 
stem the various problems which affect the international political economy 
just as blight disease or mildew attack the different branches of a plant”.22   
 
Strange highlighted the neglect of credit creation and changes to the global 
financial structure suggesting that supply of credit was as important as its 
demand.  Many of the arguments about the extent, nature and impact of 
globalisation fall down because they focus on physical transfers across 
borders including the transfer of money in terms of direct foreign investment.  
Strange believed more focus was needed on the fundamental changes that 
                                                 
17 Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalisation Is Shaping Our Lives (London: Profile Books, 
1999). p.7-8 
18 Wiseman, Global Nation? Australia and the Politics of Globalisation. p.18 
19  Examples of the first are the works of Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the 
Interlinked Economy (New York: Harper Business, 1990), Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The 
Rise of Regional Economics (New York: Free Press, 1995)..  The opposing view is represented by Paul and 
Grahame Thompson Hirst, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of 
Governance, Second Edition ed. (London: Polity Press, 1999). also Robert Wade, "Globalization and Its 
Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy Are Greatly Exaggerated," in National Diversity 
and Global Capitalism, ed. Suzanne Berger, and Ronald Dore (London: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
20 John Quiggin, "The Fall and Rise of the Global Economy: Finance," in Globalisation. Australian Impacts, 
ed. Christopher Steil (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2001).p 19 
21 Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
22 Strange. p.10 
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had taken place in the volume and nature of credit created by the market 
economy.23  
 
There seems little doubt that the term globalisation can be correctly applied to 
financial markets in the period following the collapse of Bretton Woods.24  
Along with the explosive growth in financial derivatives and a growing range 
of exotic products, foreign exchange trading has creating a money economy 
which dwarfs the “real’ economy.  These changes have in turn been 
accompanied by technological change which has had the effect of “catalyzing 
and accelerating other changes: dramatically reinforcing economic change 
and a range of structural development in the wider economy”.25   
 
In this process of change the role of the state was at times equivocal, at least in 
the case of particular nation states who saw the opportunity to gain 
advantage for themselves or as a minimum ensure no disadvantage.  For 
example, Eric Helleiner argues that “states” have in fact supported financial 
globalisation and have in general been far more content to liberalise monetary 
controls than trade barriers.26   
 
NEW GLOBAL FINANCE AND THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES  
 
Randall Germain argues that the “motor force” for the global explosion of the 
availability of private credit through diverse global sources has been the 
“progressive privatization of the global credit system” after the end of the 
“quasi-public international organisation of credit” represented by Bretton 
Woods.27  It was a change which government’s were hard pressed to control so 
that it became increasingly difficult to exercise public power over financial 
markets. 
 
Instead private monetary agents have become dominant over public 
authorities as the balance between the state and market authority was 
transformed with the state far less involved in the creation and allocation of 
credit.  As a consequence “the power of private monetary agents increasingly 
                                                 
23 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
24 Eric Helleiner, "From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: A World Turned Upside Down," in Political 
Economy and the Changing Global Order, ed. R Stubbs, and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (London: Macmillan, 
1994). P.163  Helleiner describes the growth of financial markets as the “unplanned child” of Bretton 
Woods. 
25 Phillip G Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure, and Policy 
Response," Policy Sciences 27 (1994). p319-320 
26 Eric Helleiner, "Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing States Back In," Review of 
International Political Economy 2, no. 2 (1995). also Eric Helleiner, "Freeing Money: Why Have States Been 
More Willing to Liberalize Capital Controls Than Trade Barriers.," Policy Sciences 27, no. 4 (1994). 
27 Randall D Germain, The International Organisation of Credit. States and Global Finance in the World 
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). The argument developed in these paragraphs 
is based on Chapter 4 The era of decentralized globalization. 
Geoff Anderson: Standard Bearers for the Markets 
 Page 9
shapes the context of state action within the international organization of 
credit”28 
 
The dominance of the market potentially compromises the ‘embedded’ nature 
of postwar liberalism.  It limits, “The ability of states to maintain support for 
social welfare proportions of state expenses” which in turn has become 
“dependent on the willingness of private monetary agents to buy and hold 
public securities” 29 
 
This willingness is determined by criteria which are based around profit and 
maximization of market share.  ”Access to international credit will come 
ultimately to depend upon the fulfillment of these criteria, to the detriment of 
any number of public or private needs which fall under the category of basic 
or social needs”30 
 
The process of change has removed governments from the means to control 
the creation of credit and the criteria by which credit can be obtained.  
However, in this new global financial system there are new private regulatory 
structures which determine the conditions on which credit is obtained.  
Central to how they have developed in prominence and authority is the 
process of “disintermediation” or direct financing.   
 
The work of Timothy Sinclair has formed the basis for the idea of the new 
global finance; a concept he uses to describe the consequences for global 
capital markets of the period of globalisation since the 1970s.   The 
differentiating feature of the new global finance is the process 
disintermediation by which borrowers and lenders have moved away from 
the traditional financial intermediaries, such as banks, to transact directly 
with each other through financial markets.  This has heightened the 
importance of other non-bank financial institutions such as mutual funds.  In 
short the process removes the traditional bank as the middleman in the 
process of creating credit. 
 
In a traditional bank mediated transaction a bank undertook to understand 
and assume risks on the money it lent on behalf of its depositors.  In the case 
of direct financing that risk is more likely to be assumed directly as the 
depositor becomes a lender.  The changing role for banks presents a problem 
for suppliers and users of funds.31 
 
                                                 
28 Germain. p.25 
29 Germain. p163 and p.164 
30 Germain. p.132 
31 Timothy J. Sinclair, "Between State and Market: Hegemony and Institutions of Collective Action under 
Conditions of International Capital Mobility," Policy Sciences 27 (1994), Sinclair, "Passing Judgement: 
Credit Rating Processes as Regulatory Mechanisms of Governance in the Emerging World Order." p.136 
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Seabrooke32 offers a different definition which places stress on 
disintermediation as a micro economic process within the international 
political economy and emphasizes the importance of direct financing.  He 
anticipates that the traditional banks have themselves adapted and embraced 
financial innovation to regain their pre-eminent role in the financial system.  
Nevertheless his argument is similar to Sinclair’s, “As investors act directly in 
finance market disintermediation eliminates the ' middlemen ' and promotes 
the use of financial innovations to combat risks”.33 
 
Credit rating agencies are increasingly important institutions within the new 
global financial system characterised by a move to disintermediation or direct 
financing.  It has heightened their role and their visibility as organisations 
with the capacity and knowledge to provide globally comparable information 
on risk.  This has been further enhanced by the complexity of markets and 
their global geographic scope.  The economies of scale they can capture have 
made them a viable alternative to traditional in-house research.34 
 
While credit rating agencies have come to greater prominence over the past 
twenty years, they have a longer history, particularly in the United States.  
They developed from mercantile credit rating companies in the first half of 
the 19th century that rated the ability of merchants’ ability to pay their 
accounts.  They first expanded into rating securities in 1909 when John 
Moody started to rate US railway bonds.35   Credit rating agencies occupy a 
formal role in the US through the designation of the major agencies as 
National Registered Statistical Rating Organisations (NRSROs).  Various 
pieces of legislation require that mutual organisations, such as pension funds, 
cannot invest in any security that is not rated as “investment grade” by an 
NRSRO.   In the US the reliance on ratings extends to virtually all financial 
regulators, including the public authorities that oversee banks, thrifts, 
insurance companies, securities firms, capital markets, mutual funds, and 
private pensions.”36 
 
These rules provided the context for the South Australian government’s first 
contact with credit rating agencies when SAFA, its central borrowing 
authority, sought to gain access to the US commercial paper market for US 
denominated short term funds in 1984.  This required SAFA to obtain a rating 
                                                 
32 Leonard Seabrooke, "The Political Economy of Direct Financing: Us Structural Power in International 
Finance" (MA, Flinders University of South Australia, 1998). 
33 Seabrooke. p1 
34 Fight, The Ratings Game. p.10 
35 Richard Cantor, and Frank Packer, "The Credit Rating Industry," Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Quarterly Review 19, no. 2 (1994). p.2  
36 Cantor and Packer. p.5 
Geoff Anderson: Standard Bearers for the Markets 
 Page 11
from the two major US rating agencies Moodys and Standard and Poors so 
that institutions could legally buy their securities.37   
 
As financial markets became global so too did the US credit rating agencies 
expand into those markets.  While their value to US investors was recognised 
by operators in other markets, clearly their growth also reflected the 
“structural power” of the US and the “head start” it gave US financial 
intermediaries.38 
 
Sinclair uses the term “embedded knowledge networks” (EKNs) to describe 
the basis for the authority which credit rating agencies possess.  Depending 
on circumstances, a variety of organisations act as EKN’s; professional 
associations, research departments, even trade journals.  They “possess 
authority because of their publicly acknowledged track records for solving 
problems, often acting as disinterested ‘technical’ parties in high-value high-
risk transactions, or in validating sets of norms and practices for a variety of 
service-provision activities.”39 
 
Sinclair suggests that as EKNs, credit rating agencies exercise authority over a 
transaction in two senses.  First, they contribute to control in the financial 
system by constraining thinking to a range of possibilities and, as a 
consequence, shape the behaviour of market actors.  Second they also rule in 
that they exercise a veto over certain options leading to changes in thinking 
and behaviour within markets.40 
In relation to their role in the funding of the public sector they are influencing 
the shape and ownership of public infrastructure and the priorities of 
government.  As their role has expanded they have become a form of private 
authority performing a quasi-public role of regulation. 
 
Central to the impact they have on government and the public sector in 
Australia is the overwhelmingly orthodox ideology they bring to their task 
which goes to the heart of the distinction between public and private goods.  
It is characterised by a belief in the need to reduce welfare expenditure in 
favour of income generating activity, to increase the influence of the private 
sector and, as far as possible, have services provided through the market or 
ensure full cost recovery of those provided through the public sector.  
                                                 
37 South Australian Financing Authority, "Third Annual Report 1 July 1984 to 30 June 1985," (Adelaide: 
1985).p.21 
38 Seabrooke, "The Political Economy of Direct Financing". p.44 
39 Sinclair, "Reinventing Authority." p.488  see also Virginnia Haufler, "Private Sector International 
Regimes," in Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System, ed. Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. 
Underhill and Andreas Bieler, Routledge/Warwick Studies in Globalisation (London: Routledge, 2000). 
p.122 
40 Sinclair, "Reinventing Authority." p.489 also Sinclair, "The Infrastructure of Global Governance." p.443 
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Reducing debt, particularly through privatisation is also central to the 
agencies views of what goes toward creating a strong balance sheet. 41   
 
GLOBAL CHANGE AND AUSTRALIA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
The structure of the Australian economy in the 1980s, with its heavily traded 
currency, current account problems and exposure to debt, combined with 
relatively small size, resulted in a high degree of vulnerability to international 
market sentiment.42  The structure of the economy made Australia something 
of a "leading indicator" of changes likely to occur from the pressures 
associated with globalisation.43 
 
Changes in the Australian financial system were among the most important of 
the structural changes which “globalised Australia”, particularly floating of 
the exchange rate in 1983 and financial deregulation in 1984.44 
 
The sweeping changes that occurred by way of reductions or removals of 
controls over the Australian financial system during the 1980s changed it 
from one of the most controlled banking systems in the world to one of the 
least controlled.45 
 
The process started in the 1970s with the gradual removal of controls over 
bank interest rates but picked up speed in the 1980s following major reviews 
by high-level committees of enquiry.  Reforms included the freeing up of 
interest rates on government securities and a new system of tender rates for 
new issues, and opening up the banking system to foreign competition.   
 
These changes led to the rapid growth in the size and sophistication of 
financial markets, a significant increase in the size of the financial sector 
relative to the overall economy and most significantly, “the shift away from 
traditional intermediation through balance sheets of financial institutions 
towards intermediation through markets”.46  The net effect was “a 
                                                 
41 Sinclair, "Between State and Market." pp 459-460 In this regard it is somewhat ironic, given Labor 
policy on the sale of public assets, that the reports on South Australian finances by the credit rating 
agencies make it clear that state Treasurer Kevin Foley is only in sight of regaining the state’s triple A 
rating because of the privatisation of the state’s electricity assets and the consequent reduction in debt 
levels 
42 Stephen Bell, "Globalisation, Neoliberalism, and the Transformation of the Australian State.," 
Australian Journal of Political Science 32, no. 3 (1997). p358   
43 Schwartz, "Small States in Big Trouble."p530 
44 D Meredith, and B Dyster, Australia and the Global Economy: Continuity and Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). p. 322.  They also include the ongoing reduction of tariffs among the 
main structural changes. 
45 J. O. N Perkins, The Deregulation of the Australian Financial System: The Experience of the 1980s 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1989). p.1 
46 Marianne Gizycki, and Philip Lowe, "The Australian Financial System in the 1990s," in The Australian 
Economy in the 1990s: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the H.C. Coombs Centre for Financial Studies, 
Kirribilli on 24-25 July 2000, ed. David Gruen, and Sona Shrestha (Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia, 
2000). p180 
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transformation of the Australian financial system from a relatively closed, 
oligopolistic structure in the 1950s and 1960s based predominately on 
traditional bank intermediation, to a more open and competitive system 
offering a much wider variety of services from an array of different 
providers”47 
 
The growth in direct financing through financial markets continued in the 
1990s. However, this did permanently reduce the overall importance of the 
banks in the Australian financial system, who diversified the services they 
offered and transformed themselves from narrowly based intermediaries to 
broad financial services providers.48  
 
The changes in the financial system also led to a rapid growth in risk 
mediation and securitisation products.  Gizycki and Lowe point to the 
emergence of a market for asset backed securities as the “clearest example” of 
the greater role played by markets in financial mediation, with the first 
securitisation programs being developed by state governments in the mid 
1980s to finance loans to low income households.49 
 
As the financial markets expanded and deepened, state governments were 
willing and active participants in an environment in which the influence of 
credit rating agencies could only grow stronger. 
 
But, traditionally the right of the states to borrow had been controlled through 
the Loan Council.  The story of the entry by the states into the financial 
markets to create this new environment is also the story of fundamental 
change in the way in which the Loan Council operated, changes which mirror 
the disintermediation that occurred throughout the financial system.   
 
THE STATES GET RATED: “DISINTERMEDIATION” WITHIN THE LOAN 
COUNCIL 
 
Government borrowing occupies a special place in the history of the 
Australian Federation, particularly given its connection with the issue of 
revenue distribution between the states.50  Similarly, changes to the 
arrangements by which the level of borrowings were determined, and the 
means by which those borrowings were made, occupies an equally special 
                                                 
47 Malcolm Edey, and Brian Gray, "The Evolving Structure of the Australian Financial System," in The 
Future of the Financial System:  Proceedings of a Conference Held at the H.C.Coombs Centre for Financial 
Studies, Kirribilli on 8-9 July 1996, ed. Malcolm Edey (Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia, 1996). 
48 R Battellino, "Australian Financial Markets: Looking Back and Looking Ahead," Reserve Bank of 
Australia Bulletin (2000). p.19 
49 Gizycki, "The Australian Financial System in the 1990s." p.199 
50 Cheryl Saunders, "Government Borrowing in Australia," Melbourne University Law Review 17 (1989). 
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place in the story of the Federation’s exposure to the global economy, and the 
growing influence of “the markets” over government and the public sector.   
 
These “arrangements” are encompassed within the Financial Agreement Act 
and the procedures of the Australian Loan Council.  The changes which took 
place from the late 1970s to 1993 in the control by the Council of the 
borrowings by state governments, and subsequently the formal amendment 
of the Act, set the conditions for the critical role that credit rating agencies 
play in the public sector today.  
 
Up to the end of the 1970s the controls on borrowings by the States through 
the Loan Council mirrored the strict regulation that characterised the financial 
system in that period.  The borrowing powers of the states were tightly 
controlled and the Commonwealth conducted all borrowings on behalf of the 
states.  The Commonwealth was responsible for the national debt, with both 
levels of government contributing to a National Debt Sinking Fund.  The 
Commonwealth in turn provided grants to the States to help them make 
interest payments on the debt raised on their behalf, and their contributions to 
reducing that debt through the Sinking Fund. 
 
By 1993 the States were responsible for managing their own debt.  The 
requirement for Commonwealth and State borrowing to be approved by the 
Council had been removed, as was the Commonwealth’s explicit power to 
borrow on behalf of the states, and the restriction on State’s borrowing 
through the issue of securities in their own name.  The borrowing 
arrangements of the Federation had become as “unregulated” as the financial 
system with the States active players in domestic and global financial markets. 
 
The changes that took place represent a process of disintermediation and 
direct financing similar to that which characterised deregulation in financial 
markets.  Under the previous arrangements the Commonwealth acted as a 
financial intermediary between the States and the market.  The States took 
advantage of the Commonwealth’s credit status leaving the Commonwealth 
to mediate all of the risk.  The changes saw the Commonwealth stand aside 
from its role as an intermediary, fully exposing the States to risk, and hence 
the need to establish and maintain their own credit rating which, as fiscal 
federalism engaged with the new global finance, would be monitored by the 
credit rating agencies.   
 
The driving force for the changes in Loan Council arrangements was 
primarily the determination of the Commonwealth to cut back spending by 
the States. The Council had increasingly been used by the Commonwealth as 
an instrument of macro economic policy and, given the voting arrangements 
which gave the Commonwealth two deliberative votes as well as a casting 
vote; it was an instrument that the Commonwealth could control. 
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In the 1980s the floating of the Australian dollar exposed the currency to 
market sentiment regarding the level of overall public sector debt in Australia 
given that the Commonwealth was ultimately responsible for that debt under 
the Financial Agreement.  In the 1980s the need to reduce the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) encompassing the borrowings of the 
Commonwealth, the State’s and the Territories, added a new urgency to 
traditional round of spending reductions.  For the Commonwealth the 
“audience” waiting for the result of Loan Council deliberations was as much  
“the markets” as it was the domestic political constituency.51 
 
But when the Commonwealth found that the States were increasing 
bypassing the formal controls imposed by the Loan Council, thus reducing it s 
value to them as a policy instrument, they turned to the markets for a 
solution. 
 
CHANGE IN THE LOAN COUNCIL: MOVING TO THE MARKET 
 
It is ironic that the framework for government borrowing which now applies 
between the Commonwealth and the States has returned to arrangements 
which are much closer to those that applied at the time of federation a century 
ago, and which were found wanting soon after the states came together. 
 
Despite considerable debate prior to Federation on the importance of 
borrowing powers, the Constitution that came into force in 1901 gave the 
Commonwealth power to take over the pre-federation debts of the states but 
was silent on the issue of controls on future borrowings. 52   
 
By 1919 both the states and the new Commonwealth government were 
borrowing heavily.  On the Commonwealth’s part there was a need to redeem 
or convert war debt, while the states needed to fund development, 
particularly railways.  The competition between them was both intense and 
economically damaging and created pressures that led to the formation of a 
voluntary Loan Council in 1923. 
 
This was followed by The Financial Agreement ratified by all Australian 
Parliaments in 1927-28 and a successful referendum in 1928 which allowed 
the Commonwealth to “make agreements with the States with respect to the 
public debt of the states”.  Armed with these new powers, the 
Commonwealth validated the Financial Agreement and established the Loan 
Council. 
                                                 
51 As a participant at Loan Council meetings through the 1890s I often watched as groups of Treasury 
officials anxiously discussed, and waited for, the reaction of “the market” to the deal they had invariable 
imposed on the State’s. 
52 The constitutional issues debated in the Conventions leading up to Federation are discussed in 
Saunders, "Government Borrowing in Australia." p187-189 
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While the Financial Agreement covered borrowing by the States it did not 
include borrowings by semi-government or local government authorities.  
From the outset attempts were made to restrain the borrowings of authorities, 
and to control the overall terms and timing of borrowings by requiring 
consultation with the Chairman of the Loan Council.  However, this proved 
unsatisfactory and the consultation arrangements were formalised into what 
became known as the “Gentleman’s Agreement”.  As the name implies, the 
agreement had no legal force, however, in later years the Commonwealth 
enforced the Agreement by making compliance a condition of underwriting 
arrangements.53 
 
These arrangements operated relatively unchanged until the 1970s when the 
borrowing arrangements within the Loan Council were completely recast in 
response to global financial deregulation and the growing sophistication of 
financial markets.  This had led to a rapid growth during the 1960s and 1970s 
in the number of “authorities” seeking to enter the markets.   
 
The first response was to devolve responsibility for compliance with Loan 
Council parameters for the terms and conditions of these loans to the 
individual states.  However, towards the end of the 1970s, “ the Loan Council 
began to re-examine and amend these controls to allow markets to cope with 
the increasingly large public sector borrowings and increasing sensitivity to 
yields offered on government securities.  The markets themselves had also 
become a good deal more sophisticated, with wider and deeper secondary 
markets beginning to emerge, as were complex arrangements for coping with 
risk, including interest rate futures markets and expanded short term markets 
(e.g. bank bills and promissory notes).  New financial institutions had also 
emerged, offering business and Government an increasingly wide range of 
services in a more competitive environment.” 54 
 
In 1978 the Loan Council approved new guidelines for special additions to the 
borrowings of larger authorities for financing infrastructure, ostensibly in 
response to the resources boom.  These changes also allowed for these 
borrowings to be undertaken overseas.55 
 
In 1980 the Council adopted new arrangements which moved further in the 
direction of a market-orientated approach to borrowings by semi-government 
authorities.  In 1982 all controls over the amount and terms of issue of 
domestic borrowings by electricity authorities were removed.  At its meeting 
                                                 
53 Saunders. p.203-204 
54 "Budget Paper No.7 Payments to or for the States, the Northern Territory and Local Government 
Authorities 1983-84.  Parliamentary Paper 99 of 1983," (Canberra: AGPS, 1983).p.31 
55 "Budget Paper No.7 Payments to or for the States, the Northern Territory and Local Government 
Authorities 1978-79.  Parliamentary Paper 208 of 1978," (Canberra: AGPS, 1978).p.32-33 
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in June-July 1983, the Council “effectively completed a process of 
deregulation of semi-government authorities’ domestic borrowings” with its 
decision to remove all controls over the terms and conditions of borrowings 
by authorities.56 
 
By the mid 1980s it became clear that these arrangements were not able to 
restrain borrowings by state authorities and the central borrowing authorities 
which each of the States had established.  In large part this was the result of 
state authorities resorting to what the Loan Council reports described as 
“non-conventional” financing arrangements particularly involving the sale 
and leaseback of public assets.  By this time the Commonwealth was 
increasingly concerned with the total size of the PSBR and in particular that 
part of it which related to borrowings by the states.  It was clear that the Loan 
Council’s rules were having little effect particularly as much of the increase 
was financed outside programs approved by the Loan Council.57 
 
Consequently, in June the 1984 the “Gentleman’s Agreement” was 
temporarily suspended and then in 1985 the Loan Council formally 
terminated.  It was replaced by the concept of “Global Limits” by which the 
Commonwealth and the States agreed to voluntarily limit the level of all new 
borrowings from all sources by their authorities, government owned 
enterprises and trusts.58 
 
This change was reinforced by in 1990 the decision that the States and 
Territories would progressively take over responsibility for their own debt.  In 
a further move towards deregulation the Council also agreed to amend the 
Financial Agreement to allow the states the right to issue securities in their 
own name.   
 
The decision to give the States’ full responsibility for managing their own 
debt was aimed at increasing the ability of the markets to “regulate” their 
borrowings as it was expected to “… direct growing attention to the fiscal and 
debt management strategies of individual states”59 
 
By 1993 further changes had been made completing the process of 
deregulation which had begun in the 1970s.  The changes recognised that the 
“global limits” approach had broken down in the face of the increased use of 
sophisticated financing techniques used by the states that had allowed the 
                                                 
56 "Budget Paper No.7 1983."p.33 
57 "Budget Paper No 1, Budget Statements: Budget and Other Public Sector Transactions since 1974-75 
(Statement No 6)," (Canberra: AGPS, 1984).pp.376-378 
58 "Budget Paper No.7 Payments to or for the States, the Northern Territory and Local Government 
Authorities 1986-87.  Parliamentary Paper 184 of 1986," (Canberra: AGPS, 1986).p.39 
59 "Budget Paper No.4 Commonwealth Financial Relations with Other Levels of Government 1990-1991," 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1990).p.64-66 
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Loan Council and its rules to be circumvented.60  As a result the global limit 
approach was replaced by the concept of a Loan Council Allocation (LCA). 
The LCAs were based on a measure of the deficit or surplus of each state as a 
measure of the financing requirement rather than their gross borrowings.  
Their aim was to capture transactions which had the effects of borrowings but 
were not formally classified as such.   
 
The move to LCAs was accompanied by the development of uniform and 
more comprehensive arrangements for the reporting of public sector finances 
intended to meet the markets need for accurate and meaningful information 
about the level of net borrowings on the part of each of the states.  The 
intention was to “facilitate financial market scrutiny of public sector finances 
via better reporting and so make jurisdictions more accountable to the 
markets”.61 
 
The 1992 meeting of the Loan Council also agreed to amend the Financial 
Agreement to permit the states to issue securities in their own name in both 
domestic and overseas markets and to remove the requirement that 
borrowings needed to be approved under the provisions of that agreement.   
 
Taken together, these changes completed the process which had been 
underway for more than a decade, of moving the control of government 
borrowing back into the market, and this establishing a new relationship 
between the public sector and the markets.  As the Commonwealth budget 
papers described the process: “The changes in Loan Council arrangements 
broadly reflect the evolving nature of financial markets and their interaction 
with the public sector.  The new arrangements are designed to enhance the 
role of financial market scrutiny as a discipline on the public sector and, in 
doing so, build on the changes instituted in the 1980s to enable the individual 
states to assume responsibility for managing their own borrowings and to be 
accountable to financial markets for their actions”62 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Understanding the evolution of the role that credit rating agencies now play 
in financing the public sector helps explain how and why globalisation has 
changed politics and the development of public policy within the Australian 
states.  Their role has evolved and strengthened as direct engagement with 
global financial markets became a major part of the process of financing the 
public sector in Australia.  As a result credit rating agencies have come to 
occupy a central position in that process from which they have not only 
                                                 
60 "Budget Paper No.4 Commonwealth Financial Relations with Other Levels of Government 1992-1993," 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1992).p.65 
61 Budget Paper No 4 1992.p.67 
62 "Budget Paper No4: Commonwealth Financial Relations with Other Levels of Government 1993-1994  
Pp90 of 1993."p.65 
Geoff Anderson: Standard Bearers for the Markets 
 Page 19
moved the public sector towards an embrace of the agenda of the markets, but 
have also kept them there.  As private authorities performing a quasi-
regulatory function they have contributed to the growing dominance of the 
market as a means of determining the nature and the means of distributing 
public goods.   
The practical consequences of that dominance are seen at a number of levels.  
Most obvious has been the priority given in budgets to reducing debt and 
borrowing requirements by a combination of assets sales and reduced 
expenditure.  The corollary  of reduced debt has been surpluses, recorded on 
a transparent accrual basis, and a commercial rate of return on public assets.   
 
In terms of organization and structure, formal market competition principles 
expressed through National Competition Policy have reshaped public sector 
enterprises and, along with the need to reduce debt, has provided a rationale 
for corporatisation, privatisation and public private partnerships.   
 
It has also has changed the relationship between the public and private sector 
and to an extent blurred the distinction between them.  It has encouraged the 
acceptance of private sector models of management to organize traditional 
public sector tasks, and by moving to employment-based contracts, it has 
significantly changed the ethos of the public sector.  It has also accelerated the 
movement of traditional public sector functions and positions directly to the 
private sector through outsourcing and the contracting. 
 
All of these changes within the public sector represent important areas for 
study and are of significant relevance for teaching in the area of public policy 
and management.  They are also matters which are not peculiar to Australia 
having significance for the public sector in any economy which is engages 
with global markets to seek capital for growth and development. 
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